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Abstract
This paper outlines a dynamic model with three levels of government: federal,
state and local in the Stackelberg game structure with the superor government as the
leader and all its subordinate governments the followers.It studies the optimal design
of block grants and matching grants from both the federal government and the state
governments to their numerous subordinate governments respectively as well as the
optimal public expendtures and public capital stocks of di¤erent levels of government
in the long run. Using specic form of utility function, we nd that the optimal
intergovernmental grants are very di¤erent between the level of federal government
and state governments.
Keywords: Block grants; Matching grants; Public spending; Public capital stocks;
Public investment
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1 Introduction
Designs of federal grants to localities have recently received great attention in
both theory and practice. Practically intergovernmental grants are very im-
portant because in many transitional economies in China, Eastern Europe and
Russia, the national governments are faced the problem of rationalize the scheme
of intergovernmental grants so as to achieve continuing economic growth as well
as scal equity between developed areas and backward areas. For example,the
Chinese government is now implementing a national program called the great
exploitation of western areas for the purpose of bridging the gap in economic
development that has become wider since the reform and opening in late 19700s
between backward western areas such as Tibet and developed eastern areas such
as Shanghai.Other examples concern some Latin American countries such as Ar-
gentina and Brazil which have been reforming their existing systems of grant
allocation since the early 19800s.
In theory, one prominent feature is that all studies about intergovernmental
grants modeled only two levels of government, to my knowledge, by uniting all
subnational governments including state, metropolitan,county and town as the
level of local government. This is obviously a serious limitation not only be-
cause such kind of government structure is very scarce in the real world (perhaps
with the exception of Taiwan), but more importantly, it cannot shed light on
the possible di¤erent policies of intergovernmental grants adopted by di¤erent
levels of government, for example, the possible di¤erence between the federal
grants from federal government to state governments and the state grants from
state governments to their subordinate governments in the United States. An-
other limitation in theory is that most studies only considered a static utility
maximization framework, but in the real world all levels of governments invest
and formulate capitals and, as we all know, matching grants for public invest-
ment from superior governments to their subordinate governments are important
forms of intergovernmental grants. On the other hand, in the few papers using a
dynamic approach1 , although more than one level of government is considered,
the dynamic optimization is constrained to the lowest level. As a result, these
papers obtained only a partial macro-equillibrium, leaving both matching and
nonmatching grants as exogenously given.
Motivated by the above considerations, this paper discusses the problem of
intergovernmental grants by considering the optimal choices of three levels of
government: federal government, state governments and all the other govern-
ments subordinate to state governments which we take as local governments.
The model is within the Stackelberg game structure among di¤erent levels of
government with both local governments and state governments accumulating
capitals. For simplicity, we do not consider federal public capital stocks. The
approach taken in this paper, partly from the optimal local scal theory devel-
oped in Arnott and Grieson (1981), Starrett (1980) and Gordon (1983), focuses
directly on the relation between the federal government and numerous state
1For example, see Zou [10], Barro [2003], Brueckner [2000], Solow [2003], Yin (2008) and
Zhang and Xu (2011).
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governments as well as between each state government and its numerous local
governments in choosing the optimal matching grants and block grants while
ignoring the e¤ects of taxes imposed by di¤erent levels of governments on the
private sector.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2,we set up the general frame-
work for the dynamic Stackelberg (leader-follower) game: (i) between state
governments (the leaders) and their numerous local governments (the followers)
respectivly, and (ii) between the federal government (the leader) on one side and
numerous state governments (the followers) and local governments (the follow-
ers) on the other. Some preliminary results are derived in this general, abstract
form. In Section 3, hrough a concrete example we see how the optimal choices of
intergovernmental grants, public spending and public capital stocks of di¤erent
levels of governments can be computed. In Section 4, we give some detailed
analysis and policy implications of the results we derived in Section 3. Finally
in Section 5, we conclude the paper.
2 Basic model
In this paper,we assume there are one federal government and m state gov-
ernments in the economy. A typical state government i (i = 1; 2; :::m) has ni
local (subordinate) governments, where a typical locality ij (j = 1; 2; :::ni) has
a preference dened on federal public spending f; state i public spending si,
state i public capital stock ki, its own public spending lij and its own public
capital stock kij : Thus locality ij0s utility function can be written as:
uij(f; si; lij ; ki; kij); i = 1; 2; :::m; j = 1; 2; :::ni (1)
We assume the utility function is twice di¤erentiable and satises:
@uij
@f
> 0;
@uij
@si
> 0;
@uij
@lij
> 0;
@uij
@ki
> 0;
@uij
@kij
> 0
@2uij
@f2
< 0;
@2uij
@s2i
< 0;
@2uij
@l2ij
< 0;
@2uij
@k2i
< 0;
@2uij
@k2ij
< 0
and Inada condition:
lim
f!0
@uij
@f
=1; lim
si!0
@uij
@si
=1; lim
lij!0
@uij
@lij
=1; lim
ki!0
@uij
@ki
=1; lim
kij!0
@uij
@kij
=1
lim
f!1
@uij
@f
= 0; lim
si!1
@uij
@si
= 0; lim
lij!1
@uij
@lij
= 0; lim
ki!1
@uij
@ki
= 0; lim
kij!1
@uij
@kij
= 0
To focus on the optimal design of intergovernmental grants, we bypass the
problem of optimal taxation for all levels of government and assume each locality
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and each state has xed scal revenues Tij and Ti respectively. Locality ij
receives the following grants from state i: a nonmatching grant Gij ; a matching
grant for local public investment ij _kij and a matching grant for local public
spending gij lij with ij and gij the matching rates repectively. Thus the budget
constraint for locality ij is:
_kij = Tij + gij lij + ij _kij +Gij   lij (2)
or
_kij =
1
1  ij (Tij + gij lij +Gij   lij) (3)
where _kij represents locality ij0s public investment.
Similarly, state government i receives the following grants from federal gov-
ernment: a nonmatching grant Gi,a matching grant for state public investment
i _ki and a matching grant for state public spending gisi with i and gi the
matching rates repectively. On the other hand, it transfers grants to all its ni
localities. Thus the budget constraint for state goverment i is:
_ki = Ti + gisi + i _ki +Gi   si  
niX
j=1
(gij lij + ij _kij +Gij) (4)
Substitute Eq. (3) into Eq. (4),we can rewrite the Eq. (4) as:
_ki =
1
1  i (Ti+gisi+Gi si 
niX
j=1
1
1  ij (gij lij+Gij) 
niX
j=1
ij
1  ij (Tij  lij))
(5)
where _ki represents state i0s public investment.
For simplicity, we assume federal government does not own capital stock.
Let Tf denote the tax revenue collected by the federal government. The federal
government uses it to nance its own public spending as well as all the federal
grants to m states. Thus the budget constraint for the federal government is:
Tf = f +
mX
i=1
(gisi + i _ki +Gi) (6)
Substitute Eq. (5) into Eq. (6),we can rewrite the Eq. (6) as:
Tf = f +
mX
i=1
1
1  i (gisi +Gi) +
mX
i=1
i
1  i (Ti   si  
niX
j=1
1
1  ij (gij lij +Gij) 
niX
j=1
ij
1  ij (Tij   lij)) (7)
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2.1 Local government0s optimization
Given federal public spending, state public spending , state public capital stocks,
and all the other local public spending and local public capital stocks, locality
ij (i = 1; 2; :::m; j = 1; 2; :::ni) chooses its own public spending lij and capital
stock kij to maximize a discouted utility over an innite time horizon:
max
lij ;kij
Z 1
0
uij(f; s; lij ; ki; kij)e
 tdt
subject to its budget constraint:
_kij =
1
1  ij (Tij + gij lij +Gij   lij) (3)
where  2 is the time discount factor.
Dene the Hamiltonian function as:
Hij = u
ij(f; si; lij ; ki; kij) +
ij
1  ij (Tij + gij lij +Gij   lij)
where ij is the Hamiltonian multiplier representing the private marginal
value of locality ij0s public capital stock.
The rst-order conditions are given by Eq. (3) and the follows:
@uij
@lij
+
ij
1  ij (gij   1) = 0 (8)
_ij = ij   @u
ij
@kij
(9)
plus the transversity condition:
lim
t!1ijkije
 t = 0 (10)
2.2 State government0s optimization
In each state, the state government and its ni localities play the Stackelberg
game with the state government as the leader and its localities the followers.
That is, given federal public spending and all federal grants, each state govern-
ment maximizes the weighted welfare of its localities by fully incorporating all
the localities0 rst-order conditions in Section 2.1 into its own maximization.
Specically, state government i (i = 1; 2; ::m) chooses its own public spending
si, public capital stocks ki, block grants Gij ; rates of state matching grants gij
and ij as well as all its localites0 public spending lij ; capital stocks kij and
Hamiltonian multipliers ij to maximize the weighted welfare of its localities:
2Here we implicitly assume that the time discount is uniform for all localities. In Section
4, we will privide a simple approach to test this assumption.
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max
lij ;kij ;ij ;si;ki;gij ;ij ;Gij
Z 1
0
niX
j=1
iju
ij(f; si; lij ; ki; kij)e
 tdt
where ij is the weight assigned to locality ij (j = 1; 2; :::ni):
Dene the Hamiltonian function as:
Hi =
niX
j=1
iju
ij(f; si; lij ; ki; kij) +
niX
j=1
ij1 (
@uij
@lij
+
ij
1  ij (gij   1))
+
niX
j=1
ij2 (ij  
@uij
@kij
) +
niX
j=1
ij3
1  ij (Tij + gij lij +Gij   lij)
+
niX
j=1
i4
1  i (Ti + gisi +Gi   si  
niX
j=1
1
1  ij (gij lij +Gij)
 
niX
j=1
ij
1  ij (Tij   lij))
where ij1 ; 
ij
3 are the Hamiltonian multipliers associated with Eq. (3), (9)
respectively, i4 is the Hamiltonian multiplier associated with state government
i0s budget constraint Eq. (5), ij2 is the Lagrange multipler associated with Eq.
(8)
Now the rst-order conditions are given by Eq. (3),(5),(8),(9) and the fol-
lows:
@Hi
@lij
= ij
@uij
@lij
+ij1
@2uij
@l2ij
 ij2
@2uij
@kij@lij
+
ij3
1  ij (gij 1)+
i4
1  i
ij   gij
1  ij = 0
(11)
@Hi
@ij
=
ij1
1  ij (gij   1) + 
ij
2 = 
ij
2   _ij2 (12)
@Hi
@kij
= ij
@uij
@kij
+ ij1
@2uij
@lij@kij
  ij2
@2uij
@k2ij
= ij3   _ij3 (13)
@Hi
@si
=
niX
j=1
ij
@uij
@si
+
niX
j=1
ij1
@2uij
@lij@si
 
niX
j=1
ij2
@2uij
@kij@si
+
i4
1  i (gi 1) = 0 (14)
@Hi
@ki
=
niX
j=1
ij
@uij
@ki
+
niX
j=1
ij1
@2uij
@lij@ki
 
niX
j=1
ij2
@2uij
@kij@ki
=  _i4   i4 (15)
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@Hi
@gij
=
ij1 ij
1  ij + (
ij
3  
i4
1  i )
lij
1  ij = 0 (16)
@Hi
@ij
=
ij1 ij
(1  ij)2 (gij 1)+(
ij
3  
i4
1  i )
1
(1  ij)2 (Tij+gij lij+Gij  lij) = 0
(17)
@Hi
@Gij
=
ij3
1  ij  
i4
1  i
1
1  ij = 0 (18)
plus transversality conditions:
lim
t!1
ij
2 ije
 t = 0 (19)
lim
t!1
ij
3 kije
 t = 0 (20)
lim
t!1
i
4kie
 t = 0 (21)
Proposition 1 : Eq. (11)(18) and be simplied to as the follows:
ij
@uij
@lij
  ij3   ij2
@2uij
@kij@lij
= 0 (22)
_ij3 = 
ij
3 + 
ij
2
@2uij
@k2ij
  ij
@uij
@kij
(23)
niX
j=1
ij
@uij
@si
 
niX
j=1
ij2
@2uij
@kij@si
+
i4
1  i (gi   1) = 0 (24)
_i4 = 
i
4  
niX
j=1
ij
@uij
@ki
+
niX
j=1
ij2
@2uij
@kij@ki
(25)
ij3 =
i4
1  i (26)
Proof. From Eq. (18), we have Eq. (26)
From Eq. (8) and our assumption @uij@lij > 0, we have: ij 6= 0: Thus by
substituting Eq. (26) into Eq.(16), we have: ij1 = 0: At the same time, Eq.
(17) is automatically satised.
Substiute ij1 = 0 into Eq. (12), we have: _
ij
2 = 0; thus 
ij
2 = constant.
Substitute Eq. (26) and ij1 = 0 into Eq. (11), we have Eq. (22).
Substitute ij1 = 0 into Eq. (13)(15), we have Eq. (23) (25) respectively.
Note: during the simplication, ij1 ; 
ij
2 are both eliminated.
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2.3 Federal government0s optimization
Given the optimal choices of all state governments and local governments, the
federal government as the leader in its Stackelberg game with all states and
localities the followers chooses its own public spending f; block grants Gi; rate
of federal matching grants gi and i (i = 1; 2; ::m) as well as lij ; kij ; ij ; si; ki;
gij ; ij ; Gij ; 
ij
3 ; 
i
4 to maximize the the whole social welfare, with i as the
weight assigned to state i, i.e.
max
f;gii;Gi;lij ;kij ;ij ;si;ki;gij ;ij ;Gij ;
ij
3 ;
i
4
Z 1
0
mX
i=1
i
niX
j=1
iju
ij(f; si; lij ; ki; kij)e
 tdt
subject to rst-order conditions for all states and localities given by Eq. (3),
(5), (8), (9), (22)(26) and its own budget constraint Eq. (7)
Dene the Hamiltonian function as:
H =
mX
i=1
i
niX
j=1
iju
ij(f; si; lij ; ki; kij) +
mX
i=1
niX
j=1
qij1 (ij  
@uij
@kij
) +
mX
i=1
niX
j=1
qij2
(ij3 + ij2
@2uij
@k2ij
  ij
@uij
@kij
) +
mX
i=1
qi3(
i
4  
niX
j=1
ij
@uij
@ki
+
niX
j=1
ij2
@uij
@k@ki
) +
mX
i=1
niX
j=1
qij4
1  ij (Tij + gij lij + ijkij +Gij   lij) +
mX
i=1
qi5
1  i (Ti + gisi +Gi   si  
niX
j=1
1
1  ij (gij lij +Gij) 
niX
j=1
ij
1  ij
(Tij   lij)) +
mX
i=1
niX
j=1
qij6 (
@uij
@lij
+
ij
1  ij (gij   1)) +
mX
i=1
niX
j=1
qij7 (ij
@uij
@lij
 ij3   ij2
@2u
@k@l
) +
mX
i=1
qi8(
niX
j=1
ij
@uij
@si
 
niX
j=1
ij2
@2uij
@kij@si
+
i4
1  i (gi   1))
+
mX
i=1
niX
j=1
qij9 (
ij
3  
i4
1  i ) + q10(Tf   f  
mX
i=1
1
1  i (gisi +Gi)
 
mX
i=1
i
1  i (Ti   si  
niX
j=1
1
1  ij (gij lij +Gij) 
niX
j=1
ij
1  ij (Tij   lij))
where qij1 ; q
ij
2 ; q
i
3; q
ij
4 ; q
i
5 are Hamiltonian multipliers associated with Eq.
(9), (23), (25), (3), (5) respectively,qij6 ; q
ij
7 ; q
i
8; q
ij
9 ; q10 are Lagrange multipliers
associated with Eq. (8), (22), (24), (26), (7) respectively.
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The rst-order conditions are given by Eq. (3), (5), (8), (9), (22)(26) and
the follows:
@H
@ij
= qij1 +
qij6
1  ij (gij   1) = q
ij
1   _qij1 (27)
@H
@ij3
= qij2   qij7 + qij9 = qij2   _qij2 (28)
@H
@i4
= qi3 +
qi8
1  i (gi   1) 
qij9
1  i = q
i
3   _qi3 (29)
@H
@kij
= iij
@uij
@kij
  qij1
@2uij
@k2
+ qij2 (
ij
2
@3uij
@k3ij
  ij
@2uij
@k2ij
) + qi3( ij
@2uij
@ki@kij
+ij2
@2uij
@k2ij@ki
) + qij6
@2uij
@lij@kij
+ qij7 (ij
@2uij
@lij@kij
  ij2
@3uij
@k2ij@lij
)
+qi8(ij
@2uij
@si@kij
  ij2
@3uij
@k2ij@si
) = qij4   _qij4 (30)
@H
@ki
= i
niX
j=1
ij
@uij
@ki
 
niX
j=1
qij1
@2uij
@kij@ki
+
niX
j=1
qij2 (
ij
2
@3uij
@k2ij@ki
 ij
@2uij
@kij@ki
) + qi3( 
niX
j=1
ij
@2uij
@k2i
+
niX
j=1
ij2
@3uij
@kij@k2i
)
+
niX
j=1
qij6
@2uij
@lij@ki
+
niX
j=1
qij7 (ij
@2uij
@lij@ki
  ij2
@3uij
@kij@lij@ki
)
+qi8(
niX
j=1
ij
@2uij
@si@ki
 
niX
j=1
ij2
@3uij
@k2ij@si@ki
) =  _qi5   _qi5 (31)
@H
@f
=
mX
i=1
niX
j=1
iij
@uij
@f
 
mX
i=1
niX
j=1
qij1
@2uij
@kij@f
+
mX
i=1
niX
j=1
qij2
(ij2
@3uij
@k2ij@f
  ij
@2uij
@kij@f
) +
mX
i=1
qi3( ij
@2uij
@ki@f
+ ij2
@3uij
@kij@ki@f
)
+
mX
i=1
niX
j=1
qij6
@2uij
@lij@f
+
mX
i=1
niX
j=1
qij7 (ij
@2uij
@lij@f
  ij2
@3uij
@kij@lij@f
)
+
mX
i=1
qi8(ij
@2uij
@si@f
  ij2
@3uij
@kij@si@f
)  q10 = 0 (32)
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@H
@gi
=
qi5
1  i si +
qi8
1  i
i
4  
q10
1  i si = 0 (33)
@H
@i
= (qi5   q10)
1
(1  i)2 (Ti + gisi +Gi   si  
niX
j=1
1
1  ij (gij lij +Gij)
 
niX
j=1
ij
1  ij (Tij   lij)) +
qi8
(1  i)2
i
4(gi   1)  qij9
niX
j=1
i4
(1  i)2 = 0(34)
@H
@Gi
= (qi5   q10)
1
1  i = 0 (35)
@H
@lij
= iij
@uij
@lij
  qij1
@2uij
@kij@lij
+ qij2 (
ij
2
@3uij
@k2ij@lij
  ij
@2uij
@kij@lij
) + qi3( ij
@2uij
@ki@lij
+ij2
@3uij
@kij@ki@lij
)  q
ij
4
1  ij +
qi5
1  i
ij   gij
1  ij + q
ij
6
@2uij
@l2ij
+ qij7
(ij
@2uij
@l2ij
  ij2
@3uij
@kij@l2ij
) + qi8(ij
@2uij
@si@lij
  ij2
@3uij
@kij@si@lij
) = 0 (36)
@H
@si
= i
niX
j=1
ij
@uij
@si
 
niX
j=1
qij1
@2uij
@kij@si
+
niX
j=1
qij2 (
ij
2
@3uij
@k2ij@si
  ij
@2uij
@kij@si
)
+qi3( 
niX
j=1
ij
@2uij
@ki@si
+
niX
j=1
ij2
@3uij
@kij@ki@si
)  q
i
5
1  i +
niX
j=1
qij6
@2uij
@lij@si
+
niX
j=1
qij7 (ij
@2uij
@lij@si
  ij2
@3uij
@kij@lij@si
) + qi8(
niX
j=1
ij
@2uij
@s2i
 
niX
j=1
ij2
@3uij
@k2ij@s
2
i
) + q10
i   gi
1  i = 0 (37)
@H
@gij
=
qij4
1  ij lij  
qi5
1  i
lij
1  ij +
qij6 ij
1  ij + q10
i
1  i
lij
1  ij = 0 (38)
@H
@ij
= (qij4  
qi5
1  i+q10
i
1  i )
1
(1  ij)2 (Tij+gij lij+Gij lij)+
qij6 ij(gij   1)
(1  ij)2
(39)
@H
@Gij
=
qij4
1  ij  
qi5
1  i
1
1  ij + q10
i
1  i
1
1  ij = 0 (40)
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plus transversality conditions:
lim
t!1q
ij
1 ije
 t = 0 (41)
lim
t!1q
ij
2 
ij
3 e
 t = 0 (42)
lim
t!1q
i
3
i
4e
 t = 0 (43)
lim
t!1q
ij
4 kije
 t = 0 (44)
lim
t!1q
i
5kie
 t = 0 (45)
Proposition 2 The social marginal utilities of public capital stocks of all local-
ities and states equal the social marginal utility of federal tax income.
Proof. : From our denitions, qij4 ; q
i
5; q10 are the social marginal utilities of
locality ij0s capital stocks, state i0 capital stocks (i = 1; 2; :::m; j = 1; 2; :::ni)
and federal tax income respectively.
From Eq. (35), we have: qi5 = q10:
Substitute qi5 = q10: into Eq. (40),we have: q
ij
4 = q10
Remark: from the above proposition, we can see that all local and state
public capital stocks are equivalent in regard to their marginal contributions to
social welfare. Perhaps a little surprising, raising federal taxes has the same
welfare e¤ect as the accumulation of capital stocks by subnational governments
(i.e. state and locality). The reason is that we assume the federal government
balances its budget in every period. As a result, more federal taxes means more
federal public spending and more federal grants, which contribute directly and
indirectly to the social welfare.
3 An explicit example
In Section2, we have set up a general model to discuss the optimal design of
intergovernmental grants, but the rst-order conditions are too complex to de-
rive some interesting results. In this Section, we will specify the form of utility
function to derive an explicit solution to our model. Suppose utility function
for locality ij (i = 1; 2; :::m; j = 1; 2; :::ni) are:
uij(f; si; lij ; ki; kij) = 
ij
1 ln f + 
ij
2 ln si + 
ij
3 ln lij + 
ij
4 ln ki + 
ij
5 ln kij (46)
where ij1 ; 
ij
2 ; 
ij
3 ; 
ij
4 ; 
ij
5 > 0
Obviously all our assumptions in Section 2 concerning utility function are
satised.
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3.1 Locality ij (i = 1; 2; :::m; j = 1; 2; :::ni)
The rst-order conditions (8), (9) for locality ij can now be rewritten as:
lij =
1  ij
1  gij
ij3
ij
(47)
_ij = ij   
ij
5
kij
(48)
Substitute Eq. (4) into Eq. (3):
_kij =
1
1  ij (Tij +Gij) 
ij3
ij
(49)
3.2 State i (i = 1; 2; :::m)
Under the optimal choices of its ni localities, state government i chooses its own
public spending, public capital stocks, state block grants and state matching
grants to maximize the welfare in state i, i.e.
max
ij;kij ;ki;si;gij ;ij;
Gij;j=1;:::ni
R1
0
Pni
j=1 ij(
ij
1 ln f+
ij
2 ln si+
ij
3 ln lij+
ij
4 ln ki+
ij
5 ln kij)e
 tdt
s:t: _ij = ij   
ij
5
kij
(48)
_kij =
1
1  ij (Tij +Gij) 
ij3
ij
(49)
_ki = Ti + gisi + i _ki +Gi   si  
niX
j=1
(gij lij + ij _kij +Gij) (4)
where
Pni
j=1 ij = 1
Combine Eq. (47), (49) and (4), we can rewrite Eq. (4) as:
_ki =
1
1  i (Ti + gisi +Gi   si  
niX
j=1
ij
1  ij Tij
 
niX
j=1
1
1  ijGij +
niX
j=1
ij3
ij
1
1  gij (ij   gij)) (50)
Dene the Hamiltonian function as:
12
Hi =
niX
j=1
ij(
ij
1 ln f + 
ij
2 ln si + 
ij
3 ln lij + 
ij
4 ln ki + 
ij
5 ln kij) +
niX
j=1
ij1 (ij
 
ij
5
kij
) +
niX
j=1
ij2 (
1
1  ij (Tij +Gij) 
ij3
ij
) +
i3
1  i (Ti + gisi +Gi
 si  
niX
j=1
ij
1  ij Tij  
niX
j=1
1
1  ijGij +
niX
j=1
ij3
ij
1
1  gij (ij   gij))
where ij1 ; 
ij
2 ; 
i
3 are the Hamiltonian multipliers associated with Eq. (48)(50)
respectively.
The rst-order conditions are given by Eq. (48)(50) and the follows:3
@Hi
@ij
= ij1 + 
ij
2
ij3
2ij
  
i
3
1  i
ij3
2ij
1
1  gij (ij   gij) + ij
ij3
lij
@lij
@ij
= ij1   _ij1
(51)
@Hi
@kij
= ij
ij5
kij
+ ij1
ij5
k2ij
= ij2   _ij2 (52)
@Hi
@ki
=
niX
j=1
ij
ij4
ki
= i3   _i3 (53)
@Hi
@si
=
Pni
j=1 ij
ij
2
si
+
i3
1  i (gi   1) = 0 (54)
@Hi
@gij
=
i3
1  i
ij3
ij
2gij   1  ij
(1  gij)2 + ij
ij3
lij
@lij
@gij
= 0 (55)
@Hi
@ij
=
ij2 (Tij +Gij)
(1  ij)2 +
i3
1  i ( 
Tij +Gij
(1  ij)2 +
ij3
ij
1
1  gij ) + ij
ij3
lij
@lij
@ij
= 0
(56)
@Hi
@Gij
=
ij2
1  ij  
i3
1  i
1
1  ij = 0 (57)
plus transversality conditions:.
lim
t!1
ij
1 ije
 t = 0 (58)
lim
t!1
ij
2 kije
 t = 0 (59)
3We will use the relation: lij = lij(ij ; ij ; gij) From Eq. (47)
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lim
t!1
i
3kie
 t = 0 (60)
Proposition 3 : ij = gij
Proof. From Eq. (47), we have the following relations:
@lij
@gij
=
lij
1  gij (61)
@lij
@ij
=   lij
1  ij (62)
From Eq. (57):
ij2 =
i3
1  i (63)
In Eq. (56), eliminate ij2 from Eq. (63) and use the relation Eq. (62):
ij =
1  ij
1  gij
1
(1  i)ij
i3 (64)
Combine Eq. (55) and (64) and use the relation (61), we can derive the
desired result.
Proposition 3 states that the state government i (i = 1; 2; ::m) should set
the rates of the two kinds of state matching grants for each of its localities to
be equal with one aother. This is surprising since these two kinds of matching
grants serve di¤erent purposes: one is to subside local public spending, the
other is to encourage local public investment, and in practice are considered
to be uncorrelated with each other. However, from our model, this common
practice is obviously not the optimal choice.
Using proposion 3, we can rewrite Eq. (47), (49), (50), (64) as :
lij =
ij3
ij
(65)
kij =
1
1  gij (Tij +Gij) 
ij3
ij
(66)
_ki =
1
1  i (Ti + gisi +Gi   si  
niX
j=1
gij
1  gij Tij  
niX
j=1
1
1  gijGij) (67)
ij =
1
(1  i)ij
i3 (68)
Combine Eq. (62), (68):
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ij2 = ijij (69)
Since ij is exogenously given and 
ij
5 > 0; combine Eq. (48), (52), (69),we
have:.
ij1 = 0 (70)
From Eq. (54),we have:
si =
Pni
j=1 ij
ij
2
i3
1  i
1  gi (71)
Thus Eq. (51)(57) are reduced to Eq. (52), (68)(71) together with
proposition 3.
3.3 federal government
Under the optimal choices of all the local and state governments, the federal
government chooses its public spending, optimal federal block grants and federal
matching grants to maximize the whole social welfare, i.e.
max
ij;kij ;ki;
i
3;gij ;
Gij;f;gi;i;Gi
Z 1
0
mX
i=1
i
niX
j=1
ij(
ij
1 ln f+
ij
2 ln si+
ij
3 ln lij+
ij
4 ln ki+
ij
5 ln kij)e
 tdt
s:t: _ij = ij   
ij
5
kij
(48)
_kij =
1
1  gij (Tij +Gij) 
ij3
ij
(66)
_ki =
1
1  i (Ti + gisi +Gi   si  
niX
j=1
gij
1  gij Tij  
niX
j=1
1
1  gijGij) (67)
_i3 = 
i
3  
niX
j=1
ij
ij4
ki
(53)
ij =
1
(1  i)ij
i3 (68)
and its own budget constraint:
Tf = f +
mX
i=1
(gisi + i _ki +Gi) (6)
15
where
Pm
i=1 i = 1
Substitute Eq. (67) into Eq. (6), we can rewrite Eq. (6) as:
Tf = f+
mX
i=1
1
1  i (gisi+Gi)+
mX
i=1
i
1  i (Ti si 
niX
j=1
gij
1  gij Tij 
niX
j=1
1
1  gijGij)
(72)
Dene the Hamiltonian function as:
H =
mX
i=1
i
niX
j=1
ij(
ij
1 ln f + 
ij
2 ln si + 
ij
3 ln lij + 
ij
4 ln ki + 
ij
5 ln kij) +
mX
i=1
niX
j=1
qij1
(ij   
ij
5
kij
) +
mX
i=1
niX
j=1
qij2 (
1
1  gij (Tij +Gij) 
ij3
ij
) +
mX
i=1
qi3
1  i (Ti
+gisi +Gi   si  
niX
j=1
gij
1  gij Tij  
niX
j=1
1
1  gijGij) +
mX
i=1
qi4(
i
3  
niX
j=1
ij
ij4
ki
)
+
mX
i=1
niX
j=1
qij5 (ij  
1
(1  i)ij
i3) + q6(Tf   f  
mX
i=1
1
1  i
(gisi +Gi) 
mX
i=1
i
1  i (Ti   si  
niX
j=1
gij
1  gij Tij  
niX
j=1
1
1  gijGij)
where qij1 ; q
ij
2 ; q
i
3; q
i
4 are Hamiltonian multipliers associated with Eq. (48),
(66), (67), (53) respectively, qij5 ; q6 are Lagrange multipliers associated with Eq.
(68), (6) respectively.
The rst-order conditions are given by Eq. (58), (53), (66)(68) and the
follows:4
@H
@ij
= qij1 + q
ij
2
ij3
2ij
+ qi5 +
iij
ij
3
lij
@lij
@ij
= qij1   _qij1 (73)
@H
@kij
=
iij
ij
5
kij
+ qij1
ij5
k2ij
= qij2   _qij2 (74)
@H
@ki
=
i
Pni
j=1 ij
ij
4
ki
+ qi4
Pni
j=1 ij
ij
4
k2i
= qi3   _qi3 (75)
@H
@i3
= qi4  
niX
j=1
qi5
ij
1
1  i + (
i
Pni
j=1 ij
ij
2
si
+
qi3
1  i (gi   1)
  q6
1  i (gi   i))
@s
@i3
= qi4   _qi4 (76)
4We will use the relation: lij = lij(ij); si = si(i3; i; gi) From Eq. (65), (71) respectively.
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@H
@gij
= (qij2  
qi3
1  i + q6
i
1  i )
Tij +Gij
(1  gij)2 = 0 (77)
@H
@Gij
= (qij2  
qi3
1  i + q6
i
1  i )
1
1  gij = 0 (78)
@H
@f
=
Pm
i=1
Pni
j=1 iij
ij
1
f
  q6 = 0 (79)
@H
@gi
= (qi3   q6)
si
1  i + (
i
Pni
j=1 ij
ij
2
si
+
qi3
1  i (gi   1)
  q6
1  i (gi   i))
@si
@gi
= 0 (80)
@H
@i
=
1
(1  i)2 (q
i
3   q6)(Ti + gisi +Gi   si  
niX
j=1
gij
1  gij Tij  
niX
j=1
1
1  gijGij)
 
niX
j=1
qi5
ij
i3 + (
i
Pni
j=1 ij
ij
2
si
+
qi3
1  i (gi   1) 
q6
1  i (gi   i))
@si
@i
= 0(81)
@H
@Gi
= (qi3   q6)
1
1  i = 0 (82)
plus transversality conditions:
lim
t!1q
ij
1 ije
 t = 0 (83)
lim
t!1q
ij
2 kije
 t = 0 (84)
lim
t!1q
i
3kie
 t = 0 (85)
lim
t!1q
i
4
i
3e
 t = 0 (86)
Proposition 4 : In steady state in the long run, gi = 0 (i = 1; 2; :::m)
Proof. : From Eq. (82):
qi3 = q6 (87)
Substitute (87) into (78):
qij2 = q6 (88)
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5From Eq. (65), (71), we have the following relations:
@lij
@ij
=   lij
ij
(89)
@si
@gi
=
si
1  gi (90)
From Eq. (90): @si@gi 6= 0:Thus by substituting Eq. (87) into Eq. (80),we
have:
si =
i
Pni
j=1 ij
ij
2
q6
(91)
Substitute Eq. (87), (91) into Eq. (81):
niX
j=1
qi5
ij
= 0 (92)
In steady state, _qij1 = 0;thus by substituting Eq. (88) into Eq. (73) and
using Eq. (89), we have:
q6
ij3
2ij
+ qij5  
iij
ij
3
ij
= 0 (93)
Divide both sides of Eq. (93) by ij ; sum up subscript j from 1 to ni and
use Eq. (92):
i
niX
j=1
ij3
ij
= q6
niX
j=1
ij3
2ijij
= 0 (94)
From Eq. (68), 1ijij does not contain the subscript j and can be removed
out of the symbol
P
: Thus from Eq. (94), we have:
ij =
q6
iij
(95)
Combine Eq. (68), (95):
q6 =
i
1  i
i
3 (96)
Combine Eq. (71), (91), (96),we can derive our desired result.
From proposition 4, federal government should grant nothing to state gov-
ernments to subside their public spending. This result stands in sharp contrast
to the the real world where state governments usually receive positive matching
grants for their public spending from federal government.6
5 In face, by applying Proposition 2, we can directly get Eq. (87), (88).
6Also see Gong and Zou [8], for some detailed discussion about a kind of reverse intergov-
ernmental transfer from the local government to the federal government.
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In steady state in the long run, _ij = _kij = _ki = _i3 = 0. Apply proposition
4 when necessary, we can rewrite Eq. (48), (66), (67), (53), (6) as:
kij =
ij5
ij
(97)
Gij =
ij3 (1  gij)
ij
  Tij (98)
Ti +Gi   si  
niX
j=1
gij
1  gij Tij  
niX
j=1
1
1  gijGij = 0 (99)
ki =
Pni
j=1 ij
ij
4
i3
(100)
mX
i=1
Gi = Tf   f (101)
In Eq. (99), sum up subscript i from 1 to m and substitute Eq. (98), (101)
into Eq. (99):
Tf +
mX
i=1
Ti +
mX
i=1
niX
j=1
Tij = f +
mX
i=1
si +
mX
i=1
niX
j=1
ij3
ij
(102)
From Eq. (74):
f =
Pm
i=1
Pni
j=1 iij
ij
1
q6
(103)
Substitute Eq. (91), (95), (103) into Eq. (102), we can derive q6 :
q6 =  
Pm
i=1
Pni
j=1 iij(
ij
1 + 
ij
2 + 
ij
3 )
Tf +
Pm
i=1 Ti +
Pm
i=1
Pni
j=1 Tij
(104)
Proposition 5 : In the long run, the optimal local public spending, state public
spending, federal public spending, local public capital stock, state public capital
stock, state block grant and federal block grant are as follows:
lij =
iij
ij
3Pm
i=1
Pni
j=1 iij(
ij
1 + 
ij
2 + 
ij
3 )
(Tf +
mX
i=1
Ti +
mX
i=1
niX
j=1
Tij) (105)
si =
i
Pni
j=1 ij
ij
2Pm
i=1
Pni
j=1 iij(
ij
1 + 
ij
2 + 
ij
3 )
(Tf +
mX
i=1
Ti +
mX
i=1
niX
j=1
Tij) (106)
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f =
Pm
i=1
Pni
j=1 iij
ij
1Pm
i=1
Pni
j=1 iij(
ij
1 + 
ij
2 + 
ij
3 )
(Tf +
mX
i=1
Ti +
mX
i=1
niX
j=1
Tij) (107)
kij =
iij
ij
5Pm
i=1
Pni
j=1 iij(
ij
1 + 
ij
2 + 
ij
3 )
1

(Tf +
mX
i=1
Ti +
mX
i=1
niX
j=1
Tij) (108)
ki =
i
Pni
j=1 ij
ij
4Pm
i=1
Pni
j=1 iij(
ij
1 + 
ij
2 + 
ij
3 )
1
(1  i) (Tf+
mX
i=1
Ti+
mX
i=1
niX
j=1
Tij) (109)
Gij =
iij
ij
3Pm
i=1
Pni
j=1 iij(
ij
1 + 
ij
2 + 
ij
3 )
(1  gij)(Tf +
mX
i=1
Ti +
mX
i=1
niX
j=1
Tij)  Tij
(110)
Gi =
i
Pni
j=1 ij(
ij
2 + 
ij
3 )Pm
i=1
Pni
j=1 iij(
ij
1 + 
ij
2 + 
ij
3 )
(Tf +
mX
i=1
Ti +
mX
i=1
niX
j=1
Tij) 
niX
j=1
Tij   Ti
(111)
Proof. : Substitute Eq. (104) into Eq. (91), (103), we have Eq. (106),
(107) respectively.
Substitute Eq. (95), (104) into Eq. (65), (97), (98), we have Eq. (105),(108),(110)
respectively.
Subsititute Eq. (96), (104) into Eq. (100), we have Eq. (109)
Substitute Eq. (106), (110) into Eq. (99), we have Eq. (111).
4 Analysis and policy implications
Proposition 6 : A rise in tax collected by any level of government will increase
both public spending and public capital stocks of all levels of government in the
long run, i.e.
@y
@x
> 0; x = Tf ; Ti0; Ti0j0; y = lij ; si; f; kij ; ki
for any i; i0 = 1; 2; ::: m; j = 1; 2; :::ni; j0 = 1; 2; :::ni0:
The proof is simple from Eq. (105)(109). This proposition, however, is
strong because it shows that taxes collected by any level of government have
complete externalities. If we interprete a rich government as the one with more
public spending, more public capital stocks and thus more collected taxes (vice
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versa), this proposition supports a well-known policy set by Deng Xiaoping
in China, that is Let some districts and some people become rich in advance,
afterwards they will bring along the backward districts and people to grow rich
together. Perhaps the districts which become rich in advance do not intentionally
seek to help the other districts, but the economy equillibrium in the long run
requires them to.
Proposition 7 : (i) An increase in the preference for any level of public spend-
ing increases the public spending of the corresponding level of government, but
reduces the public spending of all the other governments and the public capital
stocks of all governments.
(ii) An increase in the preference for any level of public capital stocks in-
creases the public capital stocks of the corresponding level of government, but
has no e¤ect on the public capital stocks of all the other governments and the
public spending of all governments.
Mathematically, let M be the set dened as follows:
M = ff; si; l; ki; k; i = 1; 2:::m; j = 1; 2; :::nig
then:
@y
@ij1

> 0 y = f
< 0 y 2M jffg ;
@y
@ij2

> 0 y = si
< 0 y 2M jfsig ;
@y
@ij3

> 0 y = lij
< 0 y 2M jflijg
@y
@ij4

> 0 y = ki
= 0 y 2M jfkig ;
@y
@ij5

> 0 y = kij
= 0 y 2M jfkijg
Again the proof is simple from Eq. (105)(109). Let us take locality ij as
an example to make clear one important policy implication of this proposition.
If local government ij depends more on the public spending of its superior
govern- ments, i.e. state government i or (and) federal government, which is
demonstrated by an increase in ij1 or (and) 
ij
2 ; both its public spending lij and
public capital stocks kij will decrease in the long run; in comparison, depending
more on the public capital stocks of its superior government, i.e. the state i
government, will have no negative e¤ect on either locality ij0s public spending
or its public capital stocks. This implies that state governments should pay more
attention to infrastructure investment, which helps form state public capitals,
than to direct purchases from their localities.
In regard to public spending, we can say something more. Following Davoodi
and Zou [4], the level of scal decentralization is dened as the spending by
subnational governments as a fraction of the total government spending. In our
model, we can compute the long run level of scal decentralization. From Eq.
(105) (107) as follows:
Pm
i=1
Pni
j=1 lij +
Pm
i=1 siPm
i=1
Pni
j=1 lij +
Pm
i=1 si + f
=
Pm
i=1
Pni
j=1 iij(
ij
2 + 
ij
3 )Pm
i=1
Pni
j=1 iij(
ij
1 + 
ij
2 + 
ij
3 )
(112)
21
Eq. (112) tells us that the long run level of scal decentralization is just the
sum of the weights all localities assign to subnational (local and state) public
spending as a fraction of the total sum of weights. This can help us understand
the di¤erent levels of scal decentralization in the real world. For example,
in the United States, the state and local governments are more free and more
independent to make their own public policies and have more inuences on the
people. As a result, more social welfare weights are assigned to local and state
public spending, thus the greater level of scal decentralization in the long run.
In China, the case is reversed.
Proposition 8 : (i) The more emphasis local governments put on current pub-
lic expenditure and investment, the smaller both local and state capital stocks in
the long run;
(ii) In the long run, the federal matching grant for state public investment
is very e¤ective to increase the corresponding state capital stocks, but the state
matching grant for local public investment has no e¤ect on the corresponding
local public capital formation.
Proof. : From Eq. (108), (109) we have: (i) ki; kij / 1 where  is the
uniform time discount factor, (ii) ki / 11 i while kij is not the function of ij ,
which proves our proposition.
In this propositon, (i) and the former part of (ii) is intuitive, since excessive
emphasis on current expenditures and investment is a kind of short sight, which
will do harm to the long run capital formation; on the other hand,the federal
matching grant for state public invest- ment is intended to help form state cap-
itals.7 . However, the latter part of (ii) is quite counter-intuitive. In general,we
expect that a rise in the state matching grant for local public investment would
lead the corresponding localities to divert more local resourses from public con-
sumption to public investment, thus an increase in state public capital stocks in
the long run. To put it into a policy context, we may question the e¤ectiveness
of many state incentive programs for local welfare.
This proposition also sheds light on some interesting ndings: we can esti-
mate the capital stocks in a certain locality in the long run. Conceptually it is
satisfactory to think of local governments as doing no production and owning
no capital. Then local governments just buy a ow of output from their private
sectors. These purchased services, which local governments make available to
their local households, correspond to the input that matters for private produc-
tion.8 As long as local governments and their private sectors have the same
production function, the results would be the same whether local governments
do their own production to accumulate local public capitals or purchase nal
output from private sectors. In a word, from the perspective of social welfare,
it is reasonble to think that local households have the same preference for local
7Note in our model, the matching rate i is undetermined, meaning any value of i between
0 and 1 is optimal. In the real world, the federal government has to consider many political
and historical factors so as to arrive at a realistic choice of i:
8we do not consider private capitals and private production in our model
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public spending and local public capital stocks, i.e.: ij3 = 
ij
5 ; at least approx-
mately. Thus from Eq. (105), (108), the public capital stock kij in locality ij
is just 1 times the local public spending lij :If we choose  = 0:05;
9this is 20
times. Conversely, if locality ij0s public capital stocks can be derived from other
approaches, we can estimate the time discount factor  in locality ij, and even
test our implicit assumption that  is uniform for all localities in the economy.
Proposition 9 : (i) In the long run, an increase in the tax collected by locality
ij implies less block grants from state i government to locality ij and from
federal government to state i, but more any other intergovernmental block grants;
similarly, an increase in the tax collected by state i implies less block grant from
federal government to state i, but more any other intergovernmentl block grants.
(ii) In state i in the long run, more block grants from state government to its
localities imply less matching grants for the public spending of the corresponding
localities, and vice versa.
Proof. from Eq. (110),(111) we have: (i) @Gij@Tij ;
@Gi
@Tij
< 0; @x@Tij > 0 where x
= Gi0j0 (i0 6= i or j0 6= j) or Gi0 (i0 6= i); @Gi@Ti < 0; @Gi0@Ti > 0(i 6= i0);
@Gi0j0
@Ti
> 0
(for any i0; j0). (ii) Gij _ 1  gij , which proves our proposition.
This proposition has important policy implications. Firstly, from (i), if one
district becomes rich and can collect more taxes, the federal (national) govern-
ment should reduce the federal block grant to this district and increase federal
block grants for all the other districts. In China,the eastern areas such as Shang-
hai is very developed in comparison with western areas such as Tibet and can
collect much more taxes. From our proposition, the Chinese government should
divert more national block grants from the east to the west. This is just part of
the national program called the great exploitation of the western areas in China.
Secondly and somewhat surprisingly, part (ii) tells us that there is a tradeo¤ in
the level of state government when it chooses the policies of state grants for its
localities. People may think that in order to give more help to the development
of some backward localities, their superior state governments should increase
both block grants and matching grants, including the matching grant for local
public spending. But from Proposition 9, this common idea is not optimal in
regard to social welfare. In comparison, federal government is not subject to
this kind of tradeo¤, partly because it simply sets the rate of matching grants
for state public spending to zero (see Propositon 4). Also note from Proposition
3, the two kinds of state matching rates received by local governments are equal
with one another but both undetermined, leaving for the state governments to
choose by considering some non-economic factors.
5 Conclusion
In a dynamic model of multiple levels of government, this paper examined the
optimal design of intergovernmental grants, optimal public spending and public
9Here we follow Gong and Zou [6]
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capital stocks. By considering three levels of government in the Stackelberg
game structure, this paper shed light for the rst time on the di¤erence in the
optimal intergovernmental grants adopted by di¤erent levels of government, i.e.
federal government and state governments in our paper. We summarize the
main ndings here. (i) In the long run, the state governments should set the
rates of two kinds of state matching grant: one is for local public investment,
the other is for local public spending, to be equal with one another; the federal
government, while not subject to this constraint, should simply set the rate
of federal matching grants for state public spending to zero. (ii) The federal
matching grants for state public investment is very e¤ective in the sense that
when the federal matching rate i approaches one, the capital stocks of the
corresponding state government i approaches innity in the long run (See Eq.
(109)); however, the state matching grant for local public investment has no
e¤ect on the corresponding localitie0s long run capital formation. In addition,
since in our model, the rates of the two kinds of state matching grant are both
undetermined, it does not matter for the state government i (i = 1; 2; :::m) to
simply set the matching rate for local public investment ij (j = 1; 2; :::ni) to
zero. Then from proposition 3, the state matching rate for local public spending
gij is also zero. In other words, it is optimal for state governments to transfer
only block grants to their localities. (of course, there are numerous other optimal
choices) (iii) While the optimal choices of block grants and matching grants
have nothing to do with one aother on the level of federal government, there
is a clear tradeo¤ between the state block grants and state matching grants
for local public spending. That is, it is not optimal for state governments to
increase both block grants and matching grants for local public spending for
their localities at the same time.
Even though our paper has extended the usual static approach within the
framework of two levels of government, it still su¤ers from several limitations:
we did not model the private sector and took taxes collected by all levels of
governments as exogenously given; we did not consider federal public capital
accumulation, which may inuence some of our results; and we did not discuss
the possibly di¤erent kinds of local and state public spending.10I hope that
future reseach could extend our model by considering the above limitations so
as to come closer to the real world.
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